Purpose of Review
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) has moved from recurrent poultry epizootics to a geographically extensive, multi-host panzootic involving wild birds, domestic animals, marine and terrestrial mammals, and exposed people. This expert review examines the epidemiologic transitions that produced the present wildlife-livestock-human interface and identifies surveillance priorities supported by original epidemiologic, genomic, experimental, and environmental studies.
Recent Findings
Recent primary studies show that clade 2.3.4.4b viruses are repeatedly introduced and redistributed by wild birds, can reach remote ecosystems, and have generated consequential mammalian outbreaks. The dairy-cattle emergence was especially important because genomic and pathology data demonstrated mammary-gland tropism, efficient cattle-to-cattle spread, interstate dissemination through animal movement, and secondary exposure of farm workers. Environmental sampling of water and sediment can complement bird sampling, while paired serology can complement investigation of confirmed occupational infections.
Summary
Surveillance should shift from separate poultry, wildlife, livestock, and human programs toward risk-based One Health networks that link field observations, laboratory testing, genomic data, animal movements, environmental matrices, and occupational health. Priority outcomes are earlier detection, faster cross-sector investigation, and rapid recognition of viral changes associated with altered host range or transmission.